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LESSONS FROM AKRASIA IN SUBSTANCE MISUSE: 
A CLINICOPHILOSOPHICAL DISCUSSION 
 
Abstract:  
This article explores the philosophical concept of akrasia, also known as weakness of will, 
and demonstrates its relevance to clinical practice. In particular, it helps unpack an implicit 
QRWLRQ RI FRQWURO RYHU RQH¶V DFWLRQV WKDW PLJKW LPSHGH UHFRYHU\ LQ LQVWDQFHV RI VXEVWDQFH
misuse. Reflecting on three fictional case vignettes, we show how philosophical work on 
akrasia helps avoid this potentially harmful notion of control by supporting a holistic 
engagement with people, for whom substance misuse is an issue. We argue that such 
engagement enhances their prospects of recovery by focusing on agency over time as 
opposed to individual lapses.  
Declaration of Interest: None. 
1. Introduction 
Substance misuse is an important public health issue as well as a major clinical challenge 
(Nuffield Council of Biomedical Ethics 2007). Arguably, these aspects are intimately related. 
In public discourse, substance misuse is routinely associated with increased burden to 
national health and social services, loss of productivity and the commission of more or less 
violent criminal offences. These uniformly negative connotations reinforce some stigmatising 
attitudes toward substance misuse that might not only discourage people from seeking 
professional help in a timely fashion, but also stand in the way of successful recovery. In 
turn, the relatively high relapse rates (Levy 2013) exacerbate the negative impact of 
substance misuse on to public health widely construed. Philosophical work on the nature and 
scope of akrasia (Arpaly 2000; Davidson 2001; Radoilska 2013) offers a promising way of 
breaking out of this impasse by providing the conceptual resources required to challenge an 
LPSOLFLWQRWLRQRIFRQWURORYHURQH¶VDFWLRQVWKDWVHHPVWREHDWURRWRIWKHSUREOHP While 
the article focuses on variant models of akrasia, the potential role of other relevant factors 
that could complement a holistic approach to a viable recovery plan is also acknowledged. 
2. Substance misuse: Three fictional case vignettes 
Case vignette 1 
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Mr Miller: ³%LRORJLFDOFDXVDWLRQ´ 
Mr Robert Miller is a 65 year old retired Chief Executive.  His mother died at the age of 82 
\HDUV IURP ³ROG DJH´  +LV IDWKHU GLHG DW WKH DJH RI  \HDUV IURP FDUFLQRPD RI WKH
oesophagus having been a heavy drinker throughout his adult life.  Mr Miller was an only 
FKLOGDQGGHVFULEHGDKDSS\DQGVWDEOHFKLOGKRRGGHVSLWHKLVIDWKHU¶VGULQNLQJ+HH[FHOOHGDW
school, enjoyed good peer relationships and obtained a first class honours degree at 
University.  He married in his late 20s, had two children in his 30s, and in his mid-40s 
became the Chief Executive of a national company.  He was described by his family as a 
good husband and father, with a reputation for honesty, integrity and fairness.  Throughout 
his working life he drank alcohol most days, attributing this to the stress of his job and 
frequent socialising.  In his early 60s he developed a tremor of his hands in the morning 
which he thought was anxiety.  His wife and children became increasingly concerned about 
his drinking, especially as he was known on occasions to drink and drive.  Under 
considerable family pressure he saw his GP and was referred for CBT to treat anxiety, stress 
and depression.  He attended these sessions regularly but did not find them helpful and his 
drinking pattern did not change.  Following a blood test to check thyroid function his GP 
detected markedly deranged liver function tests and referred him to a Consultant Psychiatrist 
who diagnosed moderate alcohol dependence.  Mr Miller declined the offer of medication, 
believing that he was strong willed enough to reduce his drinking on his own, but he did 
accept two counselling sessions with a substance misuse liaison worker.  When he was 64 
years old he arrived home one evening after drinking and fell out of his car in a very 
intoxicated state.  An ambulance was called and Mr Miller was taken to the A&E department.  
+HZDV³WHUULILHG´WKDWKHZRXOGEHUHSRUWHGWRWKH3ROLFHIRUGULYLQJXQGHUWKHLQIOXHQFHRI
alcohol, but this did not occur.  The shock and embarrassment of this episode led him to 
accept treatment advice from his Consultant Psychiatrist, who arranged for a home 
detoxification followed by treatment with acamprosate 666mgs t.d.s., and disulfiram 200mgs 
GDLO\ ZKLFK KLV ZLIH SURPLVHG WR VXSHUYLVH ³UHOLJLRXVO\´  )RU  PRQWKV SULRU WR KLV
retirement Mr Miller complied with treatment.  His wife, however, gave up supervising 
GLVXOILUDP DIWHU  PRQWKV DV VKH KDG VWDUWHG WR ³WUXVW´ KHU KXVEDQG DJDLQ  +LV PRRG ZDV
buoyant, his work performance strong and he looked physically fit, having lost weight.  
Against the advice of his Consultant Psychiatrist Mr Miller stopped taking medication one 
PRQWKSULRUWRUHWLUHPHQWVRWKDWKHFRXOG³HQMR\´KLVIDUHZHOOSDUW\+HZDVFRQYLQFHGWKDW
he there would be no problems with alcohol after retirement in view of his clinical progress 
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and the future stress-free lifestyle he anticipated.  He drank at his retirement party, relapsed 
back into uncontrolled heavy drinking and spent his early retirement days feeling depressed, 
deeply ashamed and bored.  His very caring family were desperate for him to stop drinking 
DQGDVNHGKLV3V\FKLDWULVWLIKHFRXOGEH³VHFWLRQHG´$IWHUVRPHSHUVXDVLRQ0U0LOOHUKDG
another home detoxification and restarted treatment with acamprosate and supervised 
GLVXOILUDP +HGUDQNRQWRSRIKLVPHGLFDWLRQDQGVWDUWHGWR WDONDERXW³FKHFNLQJRXW´E\
which he meant committing suicide. 
Case vignette 2 
Amy Parker: ³6RFLDOFDXVDWLRQ´ 
Amy Parker is a 21 year old mother of one child.  She never knew her biological father.  Her 
mother had multiple boyfriends who often brought alcohol and drugs into the home.  As a 
\RXQJ JLUO VKH ZDV JLYHQ DOFRKRO DQG ZDV VH[XDOO\ DEXVHG E\ D QXPEHU RI KHU PRWKHU¶V
temporary partners.  Her educational performance was poor and she socialised with a group 
of students on the fringe of school life.  At the age of 11 years she started smoking cigarettes 
and as a 13 year old she self-harmed by scratching the inside of her thighs with scissors, but 
this behaviour never came to the attention of her teachers or GP.  By the age of 15 years she 
KDG XVHG D ZLGH UDQJH RI ³SDUW\´ GUXJV  6RFLDO 6HUYLFHV ZHUH WHPSRUDULO\ LQYROYHG ZKHQ
Amy was found living on the streets having stopped going to school.  At the age of 17 years 
she smoked heroin and within 3 months was injecting into her arms and hands.  Amy also 
used street diazepam, cheap alcohol and occasionally shared a pipe of crack cocaine.  When 
she was 18 years old she developed a left sided DVT after injecting into her groin and was 
found to be hepatitis C positive.  She became pregnant at the age of 19 years and this led to a 
remarkable change in her behaviour.  Amy began to attend a Community Substance Misuse 
Team (CSMT) where she was started on a methadone prescription.  Her medication was 
supervised on a daily basis at a local supermarket pharmacy and the dose was gradually 
increased to 120 mls methadone mixture 1mg/ml.  This, together with the support of a 
substance misuse worker, appeared to help her stop using heroin and diazepam.  A number of 
consecutive urine and swab tests were negative for illicit drugs.  In view of being hepatitis C 
positive Amy was offered appointments at her local hospital antenatal department which she 
attended regularly.  Towards the end of the second trimester she returned to live with her 
PRWKHU$P\VDLGWKDWVKHZDVGHWHUPLQHGWRJLYHKHUEDE\WKH³EHVWSRVVLEOHFKDQFH´DQG
ZDV ³GHVSHUDWH´ WR EH D JRRG PRWKHU DQG WR FDUH IRU KHU FKLOG ZHOO  7KURXJKRXW KHU
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pregnancy Amy received close support from a Community Midwife, Social Services and the 
CSMT.  By the third trimester she was considered to have made excellent progress.  In view 
of this, and continuing regular negative tests for illicit drugs, the pick-up regime of 
methadone was reduced to twice weekly. A small-for-dates baby boy was born in good health 
(apart from a squint) at 38 weeks gestation by spontaneous vaginal delivery.  Amy 
experienced a short period of baby blues and did not take to breast feeding.  Even with close 
support she found the routine of caring for her baby demanding and exasperating.  Within 
two months of the birth Amy was no longer picking up her methadone on a regular basis and 
she began to make excuses for failing to attend her key worker appointments at the CSMT.  
When she did attend she said she was exhausted.  A drug screen taken at 12 weeks post-
delivery tested positive for heroin, cocaine and diazepam.  Conflict with her mother 
DFFHOHUDWHG ZKHQ $P\ VWDUWHG JRLQJ RXW LQ WKH HYHQLQJV OHDYLQJ WKH EDE\ LQ KHU PRWKHU¶V
care.  Her PRWKHU WROG WKH &607 WKDW $P\ ZDV ³VHHLQJ´ GUXJ XVHUV DQG GHDOHUV VKH KDG
relationships with in the past.  Despite strenuous efforts and serious warnings from the 
CSMT, a Health Visitor and Social Workers from the Child Protection Team, Amy returned 
to her ROGSDWWHUQRILQMHFWLQJGUXJXVHDQGXQVWDEOHUHODWLRQVKLSV'HVSLWH$P\¶VSURPLVHV
of improvement and pleas for clemency her son was eventually removed from her care and 
put up for adoption. 
 
Case vignette 3 
Peter Phillips: ³3V\FKRORJLFDOFDXVDWLRQ´  
Peter Phillips is a 27 year old, ex-Army Corporal with no family history of psychiatric 
disorder.  He was an average student, sporty, popular and outgoing.  After leaving school he 
joined the British Army and excelled during basic training.  He loved Army life, enjoying the 
hard work, discipline and camaraderie.  At weekends he would drink heavily with his friends 
but this did not seem to impact on his work performance.  His military Unit was closely knit, 
especially after their first tour of duty in Afghanistan.  Whilst leading a night patrol during a 
second tour in Afghanistan, the soldier behind him stepped on a landmine.  Peter was 
spattered with blood and shrapnel fragments but able to continue.  The patrol came under 
heavy fire and the men ran for cover.  Peter found himself in an irrigation channel with two 
friends.  Whilst they attempted to provide covering fire Peter showed great bravery (later 
formally recognised), running back to the wounded soldier and dragging him 20 metres into 
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the ditch.  Attempts were made to provide first aid, with tourniquets being applied to both leg 
stumps, but despite their best efforts the soldier died.  Following this Peter said that his 
QHUYHVZHUH³VKUHGGHG´+HIHOWFRQVWDQWO\LQGDQJHULUULWDEOHDJJUHVVLYHDQGJXLOty.  After 
the tour in Afghanistan was over the Unit was sent to Cyprus for R&R.  Peter got drunk every 
day, was argumentative and started getting into fights.  Back in the UK he lost interest in 
Army life and continued to drink heavily.  He made the decision to apply for premature 
voluntary retirement.  His Unit Medical Officer referred him to a CPN at the military 
Department of Community Mental Health.  The CPN thought that Peter had Post Traumatic 
Stress Disorder (PTSD) so provided an abbreviated form of trauma-focussed CBT and 
suggested to the Unit Medical Officer that a prescription of mirtazapine, 30mgs at night, 
might help.  The treatment proved beneficial.  Peter subsequently left the Army but found it 
difficult to obtain work.  He continued to suffer intermittent nightmares of the incident in 
$IJKDQLVWDQ DQG GUDQN KDOI D ERWWOH RI YRGND PRVW QLJKWV DV KH ZDV ³IULJKWHQHG WR JR WR
VOHHS´  +H ZDV XQDEOH WR PDLQWDLQ D VWDEOH UHODWLRQVKLS ZLWK D JLUOIULHQG DQG GXH WR
continuing unemployment he came under financial pressure.  His previous symptoms of 
376' UHWXUQHG ³ZLWK D YHQJHDQFH´  +LV GULQNLQJ VSLUDOOHG RXW RI FRQWURO KH ZHW WKH EHG
UHJXODUO\DQGVXIIHUHGDEDGERXWRISDQFUHDWLWLVDIWHUZKLFKKLV*3WROGKLPWR³FRPSOHWHO\
and permanently abstain froPDOFRKRO´ +RZHYHU3HWHUFRQVLGHUHG WKDWXVLQJDOFRKROZDV
the only way he could get to sleep and suppress the vivid memories, sense of danger, 
jumpiness and anxiety he experienced.  Peter was arrested after attacking a stranger in a pub 
who criticised the Army and he ended up on a Probation Order.  His Probation Officer 
arranged for referral to Psychological Services but, after waiting 4 months for an assessment, 
Peter was told that nothing could be done for him until he stopped drinking.  Following 
referral to a Community Substance Misuse Team he received an in-patient detoxification 
during which he was re-referred to Psychological Services.  Peter continuing to have 
nightmares of Afghanistan, feelings of anger and aggression, and panic attacks.  He kept 
away from all reminders of military life and avoided watching TV news programmes.  Within 
two weeks of leaving the detoxification unit he started to drink a bottle of vodka a day.  He 
was again turned away from Psychological Services because of his alcohol consumption.  
Peter has managed to get a job as a Car Park attendant but is still drinking very heavily and 
VXIIHULQJIURP376'+HVD\VKH³KDWHVWKHWDVWH´RIDOFRKRODQGZDQWVWRVWRSGULQNLQJEXW




3. Voluntary action as intention implementation and its implications for 
substance misuse 
The model of action as implementation of prior intention (Gollwitzer 1999; O'Connor and 
Sandis 2012) offers a plausible way of explaining voluntary, viz. intentional actions as 
opposed to coerced ones. Following this line of thought, voluntary actions could be fully 
accounted for by an agent acknowledging: 
µ,GLGĳEHFDXVH,ZDQWHGWRĳ¶in so far as this means  
µ,GLGĳbecause ,OLNHFDUHDERXWĳ-LQJ¶ or  
µ,GLGĳEHFDXVHE\ĳ-LQJ,JHW>FORVHUWR@[\]WKDW,OLNHFDUHDERXW¶ 
In contrast, coerced actions are not accurately explained by pointing to the fact that the agent 
consented to perform them. Even a first-pHUVRQDFFRXQWVXFKDVµ,GLGĳEHFDXVH,ZDQWHGWR
ĳ¶UHPDLQVLQVXIILFLHQW,QLQVWDQFHVRIFRHUFLRQWKLVVWDWHPHQWVWDQGVIRU 
µ,GLGĳEHFDXVH,ZDVPDGHWR>ZDQWWR@ĳ¶RU 
8QOHVV,ĳ-ed, x, y, z that I like/care about, would have been lost or damaged6R,GLGĳ¶FI
Radoilska 2013b). 
The distinction between these two categories of actions, voluntary and coerced, is central to 
our thinking about intentional agency in terms of authorship and ownership of actions. In 
particular, it helps to pin down the idea of an agent as the ultimate source of actions, which 
are free, intentional, and uncompelled. At the same time, however, the basic structure of 
action that the distinction builds upon might not be as helpful once we go beyond the one-
step everyday actions, such as making a cup of tea or catching a train that contribute to the 
intuitive appeal of this model. This is because the notion of action as implementation of prior 
intention hangs on two underlying presuppositions that do not justice to the variety of forms 
that intentional agency might take. According to the first presupposition, voluntary actions 
flow from an explicit decision or choice made by the agent. According to the second, in the 
absence of coercion, the application of direct conscious effort is sufficient to translate such a 
decision into action.    
Applied to substance misuse, this conception of voluntary action would support two possible 
alternatives. On the first, substance misuse is voluntary and therefore either chosen by the 
agent or resulting from his or her unwillingness to make the effort required to control 
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problematic consumption. On the second alternative, substance misuse is involuntary. The 
agent is deemed unable to exert control over this aspect of his or her behaviour.  
Adopting the first alternative leads to a criminal model of substance misuse (Morse 2000). 
On this model, substance misuse boils down to a kind of transgression or dereliction of duty 
that is best tackled by the implementation of strong disincentives or penalties, whose role is 
to provide a reliable deterrent. Elements consistent with the criminal model of substance 
PLVXVH FDQ EH REVHUYHG LQ WKH WUHDWPHQW RI µ$P\ 3DUNHU¶ DQG µ3HWHU 3KLOLSV¶ WZR RI WKH
fictional case vignettes we propose for discussion in this article: Amy is faced with the 
GHWHUUHQW RI KDYLQJ KHU FKLOG SXW IRU DGRSWLRQ XQOHVV VKH PDQDJHV WR µVWD\ FOHDQ¶ (Case 
Vignette 2), while Peter can only access much needed Psychological Services if he abstains 
from alcohol (Case Vignette 3). 
Adopting the second alternative leads to a medical model of substance misuse. On this model, 
substance misuse points to aetiology that may include biological, social or psychological 
causes beyond personal choice and control. The proposed case vignettes can be read as 
LOOXVWUDWLRQVRIWKHDIRUHPHQWLRQHGNLQGVRIFDXVDWLRQHJµ0U0LOOHU¶± biological, Amy ± 
social, and Peter ± psychological. In other words, substance misuse is taken to indicate 
certain passivity on the part of the user to the extent that, like any illness, it is something that 
happens to them instead of being done by them (Frankfurt 1971). The underlying intuition is 
PDGHSDUWLFXODUO\ VDOLHQW LQ0UV0LOOHU¶V UHTXHVW WKDWKHUKXVEDQGEH VHFWLRQHG VLQFHKH LV
unable to control his alcohol consumption (Case Vignette 1). Treatment is called for to 
FRPSHQVDWHIRUDQDJHQW¶VDSSDUHQWO\LQVXIILFLHQWFRQWURORYHUDSDUWLFXODUDVSHFWRIKLVRUKHU
behaviour.    
The coexistence of these alternative models leads to an apparent dilemma in societal as well 
as clinical responses to substance misuse: to treat, endorsing the medical model, or to deter 
and penalise, endorsing the criminal one. Both responses however imply that, in so far as 
substance misuse is an illness rather than a personal choice, no responsibility attaches to it. 
Furthermore, whenever responsibility for substance misuse comes to the fore, it is captured as 
much as possible in value-neutral terms. The underlying ambition, to avoid stigmatising 
further people for whom substance misuse is an issue, is understandable. Nevertheless, the 
resulting strategy is counterproductive as it suggests that responsibility for substance misuse 
can be assessed from the third-personal perspective of an impartial and expert observer. In so 
doing, it inadvertently underwrites the objectifying attitudes toward vulnerable agents that it 
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means to avoid. Box 1 summarises the key issues and problem areas arising from 
understanding akrasia on the model of voluntary action as implementation of prior intention.  
4. Philosophical work on akrasia 
Philosophical discussions of akrasia challenge the basic model of voluntary action as 
intention implementation. In this respect, they can be of direct relevance to clinical practice: 
by revising this model, it becomes possible to develop a better strategy for addressing 
substance misuse, beyond the limitations of the medical and criminal alternatives. To identify 
possible lessons from akrasia, this section first offers a concise overview of two classical 
FRQFHSWLRQV 3ODWR¶V DQG $ULVWRWOH¶V ,W WKHQ UHFDSV FHQWUDO WHQHWV RI 'RQDOG 'DYLGVRQ¶V
conception of weakness of will, which has been instrumental in shaping contemporary 
thinking on this issue.  
Plato and Aristotle on akrasia 
3ODWR¶V DQG $ULVWRWOH¶V WKHRULHV RI DNUDVLD DUH RI PDMRU SKLORVRSKLFDO LQWHUHVW LQ WKHLU RZQ
right; furthermore, their influence can be readily felt in the current debates on this topic. 
Protagoras and Nicomachean Ethics, Book VII are the two main texts presenting their 
respective positions ± the first rejecting, the second defending the possibility of akrasia. An 
additional source is the Republic, Book IV in which Plato draws a more nuanced picture.  
Importantly, both Plato and Aristotle discuss akrasia as an irreducibly ethical issue. For 
LQVWDQFH3ODWR¶VUHMHFWLRQRIDNUDVLDLVJURXQGHGLQWKHVR-called Socratic intellectualism: the 
idea that no one does wrong knowingly. On this view, what looks like an akratic behaviour, 
such as jeopardising long-term projects for the sake of instant gratification is recast as being 
mistaken about what really matters. In other words, akrasia amounts to a kind of ignorance or 
cognitive failure rather than a failure of self-control. This cognitive failure is explicitly 
defined in ethical terms: an akratic person is ignorant about ethical matters and this ignorance 
constitutes a distinct character flaw. %R[VXPPDULVHV3ODWR¶VYLHZRIDNUDVLDLQWKHFRQWH[W
of substance misuse. 
Aristotle moves away from the Socratic intellectualism by introducing the notion of an 
apparent conflict of values. In essence, an akratic person mistakenly perceives good and 
pleasant courses of action as mutually exclusive. The former are deemed as difficult and 
unrewarding albeit valued, the latter, as immediately gratifying yet ultimately worthless. And 
so, akratic action is a response to the appeal of pleasure that is disvalued, in the face of 
9 
 
valuable but challenging alternatives. On this picture, confused cognition and faltering self-
control are intertwined: disvalued courses of action seem pleasant to an akratic person only as 
a result of akrasia. Once indulged, they, inevitably, turn out to be disappointing. Similarly, 
valuable courses of action forgone as difficult and unrewarding only appear so through the 
lens of akrasia. Awareness of lost opportunities contributes to the underlying frustration of 
the akratic experience, which offers but dissatisfying pleasure. 
As illustrated in Box 3, iQWHUPVRIHWKLFDODVVHVVPHQW$ULVWRWOH¶VPRGHORIDNUDsia points to a 
kind of weakness rather than wrongness. This becomes apparent, if we consider the four main 
features of this model, which can be summarised as follows: 
- firstly, akrasia is a character disposition between virtue and vice. It cannot be 
assimilated to either;  
- secondly, akrasia is closely related to another character disposition, enkrateia or 
strength of will. They both share the confused conception of good being incompatible 
with pleasure;  
- thirdly, failing self-control is only an indication rather than a defining feature of 
akrasia; and  
- fourthly, unlike vice, akrasia can be overcome over time. This is achieved via a two-
stage process, which starts with an akratic agent moving toward an enkratic pattern of 
action, whereby akratic pleasures are avoided but nevertheless missed, and ends with 
the now enkratic agent coming to appreciate valuable activities as inherently 
rewarding and enjoyable. This corrected evaluative perspective effaces the appearance 
of conflict between pleasure and goodness that motivates akrasia.    
Davidson on weakness of will 
'RQDOG'DYLGVRQ¶VVHPLQDUSDSHUµ+RZLVZHDNQHVVRIWKHZLOOSRVVLEOH"¶ (2001) brought the 
topic into prominence in contemporary philosophy. Since its original publication in 1970, it 
has served as a standard, in relation to which later conceptions of akrasia are often defined. 
According to Davidson, akrasia or weakness of will is acting ± knowingly and willingly ± 
DJDLQVWRQH¶VEHWWHUMXGJPHQW+HDUJXHVDJDLQVWWKHWKHQGRPLQDQWYLHZDFFRUGLQg to which 
akrasia is merely apparent and not a real issue since it is impossible to sincerely make an 
HYDOXDWLYHMXGJPHQWVXFKDVµ'ULQNLVEDGIRUPH¶ZLWKRXWDWWKHVDPHWLPHEHLQJPRWLYDWHG
to abstain from drinking (cf. Hare 1952). Davidson addresses this challenge by showing that 
although we cannot go against unconditional evaluative judgements of ours we can go against 
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all-things-considered judgments, VXFKDVµ2YHUDOOGULQNLVEDGIRUPH¶by thinking along the 
OLQHV µ\HW WKLV GULQN ZLOO UHOD[ PH¶ 7he capacity of bracketing out our own all-things-
considered judgements in this way makes akrasia possible. %R[LQGLFDWHVKRZ'DYLGVRQ¶V
view could be applied to instances of substance misuse.   
In later works, Davidson (e.g. 2004) pursues further this line of thought to reach the 
conclusion that akrasia is a form of irrationality resembling self-deception. This is because 
DNUDVLD GHULYHV IURP KROGLQJ D FRQWUDGLFWRU\ KHQFH LUUDWLRQDO MXGJPHQW VXFK DV µ'ULQN LV
EDG DQG DW WKH VDPH WLPH JRRG IRU PH¶ FRQcealed from the conscious mind. Instead, the 
FRQWUDGLFWLRQWDNHVWKHIRUPRIWZRPXWXDOO\H[FOXVLYHMXGJPHQWVµ'ULQNLVEDGIRUPH¶DQG
µ'ULQN LV JRRG IRU PH¶ WKDW DUH NHSW VHSDUDWH E\ DQ XQGHUO\LQJ mechanism of mind-
partitioning. As a result, the irrationality of akrasia hardly ever comes to the fore at the point 
of akratic action.  
The Davidsonian account of akrasia has four main features:  
- firstly, akrasia is different from other failures of rationality, such as ambivalence, 
procrastination or indecisiveness;  
- secondly, it points to a failure to exercise rational self-control when this is clearly 
ZLWKLQRQH¶VUHPLW 
- thirdly, this failure is defined in prudential as opposed to moral terms ± acting against 
RQH¶Vown better judgement; and  
- fourthly, akrasia is exemplified in individual actions as opposed to patterns of 
behaviour over time.  
Alternative conceptions of akrasia, such as Bratman (1979) and Holton (1999) challenge the 
fourth feature and argue that akrasia is a failure of maintaining stable intentions over time. 
Nevertheless, they share the key aspects of the conceptual framework set out by Davidson 
that are of particular relevance to clinical practice: akrasia is seen as a prudential, not a moral 
failure of self-control. There are three further theoretical paradigms, from which the issue of 
akrasia could be explored: 1) theories of volition in neuroscience, psychology and the social 
sciences emphasising readiness potential (Mele 2012; Walter 2012) 2) philosophical 
discussions of free will engaging with issues, such as determinism, indeterminism and 
compatibilism (Bishop 20012; Nahmias 2012), and 3) interdisciplinary work on motivation 
and resilience (McGregor et al. 2009). For the purposes of the present discussion, it is 
important to note that in spite of significant differences at methodological and conceptual 
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level, all three paradigms share the feature of considering self-control from a prudential as 
opposed to moral perspective.      
 
5. Discussion 
At first blush, there is a clash between classical and contemporary approaches to akrasia or 
weakness of will: the former opt for an ethical, the latter for a prudential appraisal. However, 
a closer look reveals that the underlying contrast is of degree or emphasis only. Classical 
approaches of akrasia avoid the stigmatising implications associated with a moralised attitude 
to failing self-control. In this respect, they are well-suited to address timely concerns about 
WKH µYLQGLFWLYHQHVV¶RI UHVSRQVLELOLW\ WDON LQ WKH FRQWH[WRI VXEVWDQFHPLVXVHDQG VXEVWDQFH
dependence (Poland and Graham 2011). Arguably, the classical approaches fare better than 
recent attempts WRVNHWFKDVHFRQGDU\QRWLRQRIUHVSRQVLELOLW\VXFKDVµUesponsibility without 
blame¶ (Sinnott-Armstrong and Pickard 2013). The reason for this is twofold. Firstly, no 
stigmatising effect arises from discussing akrasia in ethical terms as long as the first-personal 
perspective of akratic agents is treated on a par with the third-personal perspective of experts, 
observers and other interested parties. This is because stigmatisation does not flow from 
ethical considerations about akrasia. Instead, it derives from the implicit imbalance of third- 
and first-personal standing that comes with insulating expert from ethical discourse. 
Secondly, by employing an explicit ethical vocabulary for understanding and appraising 
akrasia, the classical approaches counterbalance the objectifying trend of a third-personal 
narrative whereby DµSDWLHQW¶ is someone who LVµDFWHGXSRQ¶DQGµSDVVLYH¶In particular, by 
acknowledging substance misuse as something that a person does rather than something that 
happens to a person, an ethical outlook on akrasia strengthens the foundations of personal 
agency. In so doing, it provides the conceptual resources needed for engaging people with 
problematic substance use as full members of the moral community. 
Broadening the prudential interpretation of akrasia to encompass explicit ethical 
considerations has the welcome upshot of deemphasising self-control in terms of direct 
conscious effort over individual actions. As clarified in Section 3, the model of voluntary 
action as implementation of prior intention does justice only to some basic one-step actions 
but cannot be helpfully generalised to account for agency over time.  
In the context of substance misuse, this basic model happens to support an unhelpful focus on 
µUHODSVHV¶ DV LQGLFDWLYH WKDW µDOO LV ORVW¶, as poignantly illustrated by the fictional case 
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YLJQHWWHV SUHVHQWHG LQ 6HFWLRQ  µ0U 0LOOHU¶ µ$P\ 3DUNHU¶ DQG µ3HWHU 3KLOLSV¶ DOO DUH
expected and expect of themselves to somehow take control over substance use rather than 
revisit their projects and commitments as a whole. Yet, on reflection, the underlying 
compartmentalisation ± SUREOHPDWLFµRXWRIFRQWURO¶EHKDYLRXURQWKHRQHKDQG and on the 
other, meaningful occupations, such as employment, family life and child care ± is 
unsustainable. This is because both sides of life ± problematic and meaningful ± are 
perceived through the lens of the basic model of voluntary action, which in fact is inadequate 
for either. As shown by recent philosophical work (Radoilska 2013a), this model explains 
well only lesser, secondary actions at the periphery of intentional agency. The fact that these 
actions are relatively frequent in our everyday lives does not change their conceptual status, 
which is derivative. By setting aside the model of voluntary action as intention 
implementation, this new theory allows us to adopt a holistic approach to personal agency as 
actualisation of a person. On this theory, problematic aspects can be readjusted once they are 
recovered as expressions ± be it peripheral ± of a self. In other words, by putting back agency 
at the heart of action, philosophical work on akrasia can be usefully integrated into a viable 
recovery plan that turns patients into lead agents.  
Additional factors that could complement the holistic approach include: 1) maintaining stable 
intentions over time (Bratman 2007), 2) improving participation and 3) nesting intention 
implementation within a behavioural modification network (Schweiger Gallo 2009), all of 
which can be achieved by putting in place structures of positive behavioural support (Gore et 
al. 2013). 
6. Conclusion  
This article identified and explored lessons from akrasia that could inform clinical practice in 
cases of substance misuse. In particular, we articulated the negative implications of an 
intuitively appealing yet misleading model of voluntary action as implementation of prior 
intention. We then expanded on an alternative model of action as actualisation and showed its 
advantages in supporting a holistic approach to personal agency in the context of substance 
misuse.  
 








Box 2: 3ODWR¶VYLHZRIZHDNQHVVRIZLOOapplied to substance misuse (problem areas in red): 








I freely intend to do x instead 
of y, because ,GRQ¶WNQRZ
that y is more important than 
x 
 
I intentionally take drugs, but 










I take drugs, EHFDXVH,GRQ¶W






















I freely intend to do x 
 
 
I choose to drink (even 
WKRXJK WKH\ ZRQ¶W OHW
me get psychotherapy 
for my PTSD); 
 


















































I do not want to do x 
EXWLI,GRQ¶WGR[WKHUH
are disadvantages  
 
 
I do not want to drink 






I try hard but the 
desire to drink 
overcomes me 
I do x (but 
LW¶V QRW
really what I 
want) 
 












Box 3: $ULVWRWOH¶VYLHZRIZHDNQHVVRIZLOO(problem areas in red): 
















What is good and highly 




What is pleasant is not good 
and is not highly valued 
 






































I use drugs and alcohol 
ZKLFK,OLNHEXW,NQRZ,¶P
wasting my life) 
 
Box 4: 'DYLGVRQ¶VYLHZRIZHDNQHVVRIZLOO (problem areas in red): 









It is best if I do not do x 





right now in this particular 
instance I think it is worth 
doing x 
Conscious effort I do x  
 
I know x is against my own 
better judgement  
 
I could refrain from doing x 
if I wanted 
 
 
Acknowledgements: We would like to thank the three anonymous reviewers of this article 
for their helpful comments and suggestions on an earlier version. We are also grateful to the 
Editors of APT for their support throughout this project.  
 
References: 
Aristotle (2001). Nicomachean Ethics. Edited and Translated by Roger Crisp. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press.  
15 
 
$USDO\ 1  2Q $FWLQJ 5DWLRQDOO\ $JDLQVW 2QH¶V %HWWHU -XGJPHQW Ethics 110 (3): 
488-513. 
Bishop, R. (2012). Chaos, Indeterminism and Free Will. In Kane, R. (ed.) The Oxford 
Handbook of Free Will. Oxford: Oxford University Press. DOI: 
10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195399691.003.0004 
Bratman, M. (1979). Practical Reasoning and Weakness of the Will. Noûs 13: 153-171 
Bratman, M. (2007). Structures of Agency. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Davidson, D. (2001). How Is Weakness of the Will Possible? In Essays on Actions and 
Events. 2nd ed. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 21±42. 
Davidson, D. (2004). Paradoxes of Irrationality. In Problems of Rationality. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 170±188. 
Frankfurt, H. (1971). Freedom of the will and the concept of a person. Journal of Philosophy 
68: 5±20 
Gollwitzer, P. (1999). Implementation Intentions: Strong Effects of Simple Plans. The 
Amercian Psychologist 54:493±503. 
Gore, NJ, McGill, P., Toogood, S., Allen, D., Hughes, JC, Baker, P., Hastings, RP, Noone, 
SJ, Denne, LD (2013) Definition and Scope for Positive Behavioural Support. International 
Journal of Positive Behavioural Support 3(2): 14±23 
Hare, R. (1952). The Language of Morals. Oxford: Clarendon Press  
Holton, R. (1999). Intention and Weakness of Will. Journal of Philosophy 96: 24±62. 
Mele, A. (2012). Free Will and Science. In Kane, R. (ed.) The Oxford Handbook of Free Will. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195399691.003.0026 
McGregor, I, Nash, K. and Inzlicht, M. (2009) Threat, High Self-Esteem, and Reactive 
Approach-Motivation: Electroencephalographic Evidence. Journal of Experimental Social 
Psychology 45(4): 1003±1007. 




Nahmias, E. (2012). Intuitions about Free Will, Determinism, and Bypassing. In Kane, R. 
(ed.) The Oxford Handbook of Free Will. Oxford: Oxford University Press. DOI: 
10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195399691.003.0029 
Nuffield Council on Bioethics (2007). Public Health: Ethical Issues, available at  
http://www.nuffieldbioethics.org/go/ourwork/publichealth/publication_451.html 
Levy, N. (ed.) (2013) Addiction and Self-Control: Perspectives from Philosophy, 
Psychology, and Neuroscience. New York: Oxford University Press.  
O'Connor, T. and Sandis, C. A Companion to the Philosophy of Action. Oxford: Blackwell, 
2012 
Poland J. and G. Graham. (eds.) Addiction and Responsibility. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 
2011. 
Plato (2008). Protagoras. Edited and Translated by Nicholas Denyer. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Plato (1992). Republic, 2nd ed. Translated by G.M.A. Grube; Revised by C.D.C. Reeve. 
Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company.  
Radoilska, L. (ed.) (2012) Autonomy and Mental Disorder. Oxford: Oxford University Press 
Radoilska, L. (2013a) Addiction and Weakness of Will. Oxford University Press. 
Radoilska, L. (2013b) Depression, Decisional Capacity, and Personal Autonomy. In K.W.M. 
Fulford, M. Davies, R. Gipps, G. Graham, J. Sadler, G. Stanghellini, and T. Thornton (eds.), 
The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Psychiatry. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013; 
1155±1170. 
Sinnott-Armstrong, W. and H. Pickard (2013). What is Addiction? In K.W.M. Fulford, 
M. Davies, R. Gipps, G. Graham, J. Sadler, G. Stanghellini, and T. Thornton (eds.), The 
Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Psychiatry. Oxford: OUP, 2013; 851±864. 
Schweiger Gallo, I., Keil, A., McCulloch, K. C., Rockstroh, B., & Gollwitzer, P. M. (2009). 




Walter, H. (2012) Contributions of Neuroscience to the Free Will Debate: From Random 
Movement to Intelligible Action. In Kane, R. (ed.) The Oxford Handbook of Free Will. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195399691.003.0027 
Learning Objectives 
1. Understand the implications of the intention implementation model of action for 
treating substance misuse.  
2. Appreciate the relevance of philosophical work on akrasia for supporting recovery 
from substance misuse.  
3. Weigh up the advantages of applying alternative models of intentional agency in 
clinical responses to substance misuse. 
 
MCQs 
Select the single best option for each question stem 
1. The intention implementation model of voluntary action: 
a. endorses a holistic view of agency 
b. cannot account for coerced actions 
c. helps avoids judgmental attitudes toward patients with substance misuse 
d. supports the first-personal perspective of patients as agents 
e. emphasises a potentially unhelpful notion of control. 
2. 2Q3ODWR¶Vconception, akrasia: 
a. has no ethical significance  
b. is caused by an overwhelming appetite for pleasure  
c. cannot be cured 
d. is a distinct cognitive failure 




a. is just another vice 
b. is defined by lack of self-control 
c. only offers disappointing pleasures 
d. can be helped by the conscious exercise of willpower 
e. derives from a genuine conflict of values. 
4. 2Q'DYLGVRQ¶VFRQFHSWLRQZHDNQHVVRIZLOO 
a. is acting knowingly and wilOLQJO\DJDLQVWRQH¶VEHWWHUMXGJPHQW 
b. is very similar to other failures of rationality, such as procrastination 
c. DPRXQWVWRFKDQJLQJRQH¶VPLQGWRRRIWHQ 
d. cannot be explained from a value-neutral perspective 
e. is an everyday phenomenon. 
5. The model of action as actualisation: 
a. insulates expert from ethical discourse 
b. treats patients with substance misuse as fully responsible agents 
c. VXSSRUWVWKHSURJUDPPHRIµUHVSRQVLELOLW\ZLWKRXWEODPH¶LQFOLQLFDOUHVSRQVHV
to substance misuse  
d. deemphasises self-control 
e. promotes a compartmentalised approach to patient well-being. 
 
Answers: 1e; 2d; 3c; 4a; 5b 
